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Incentivising Investment in the UKCS: a Response to Supporting 
Investment: a Consultation on the North Sea Fiscal Regime 
 
Professor Alexander G Kemp and Linda Stephen 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The publication of the Treasury consultation document Supporting Investment: 
a Consultation on the North Sea Fiscal Regime in November 2008 signalled the 
UK Government’s desire to enhance the pace of activity in the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS).  It is well known that oil and gas production has been falling at a 
brisk pace since the peak reached in 1999.  The consultation covers several 
subjects, the most important of which relates to incentives for new field 
development.  The document refers in particular to small fields, heavy oil fields, 
HP/HT fields, and fields located West of Shetlands.  Other topics raised relate 
to capital gains tax, where specific proposals are made with respect to licence 
swaps and reinvestment relief, and change of use where the Government has out 
set its conclusions from discussions held with the industry over the last two 
years.  The document also refers to the question of the whole future of PRT the 
abolition of which, particularly through a buyout arrangement, has been 
discussed over the last two years. 
 
This paper discusses the case for incentives for new field developments in detail 
and makes observations on other related topics including in particular the 
continuing need to incentivise investment in incremental projects in PRT-
paying fields and further exploration. 
 
2. Methodology and Assumptions 
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The issue of the appropriate share of the revenues from the UKCS which should 
be collected by the Government on behalf of the whole nation is a complex one 
and has been vigorously debated in the UK since the special taxation regime for 
the UKCS was introduced in 1975.  While there is wide agreement that a share 
of any economic rents generated from the UKCS should accrue to the nation the 
measurement of the rents and the appropriate share which should be collected 
have proved elusive in practice.  The present tax system for new field 
developments is essentially a cash flow one for investors who are already in a 
tax-paying position.  This has considerable merit in terms of incentives with the 
post-tax rate of return (IRR) remaining equal to the pre-tax rate.  But investment 
decisions in the petroleum industry take into account not only the expected rate 
of return but the materiality of the project.  This is conventionally measured by 
the size of the net present value (NPV).  Investors also increasingly examine 
investment opportunities in the UKCS in relation to these in other parts of the 
world.  Given the need to allocate limited capital budgets to greatest effect 
projects are valued in accordance with their expected capital productivity.  This 
is measured by the NPV/ I ratio where NPV is calculated on a post-tax basis 
while I is on a pre-tax basis.  (This reflects the behaviour of the industry where 
capital is allocated on a pre-tax basis.  The text book formula generally 
measures both NPV and I on a post-tax basis).  The well-know problems in the 
financial markets have reduced the availability of both debt and equity capital 
for companies requiring external capital.  This has exacerbated the capital 
rationing problem. 
 
In the light of the above in this study the base case investment hurdle required 
by investors has been set at NPV/ I ≥ 0.3 where the NPV calculation employs a 
discount rate of 10% in real post-tax terms (c. 12.5% in money-of-the-day-
terms), and I employs a real pre-tax discount rate of 10% (c. 12.5% in money-
of-the-day-terms). 
 4
 
The projections of production and expenditures have been made through the use 
of financial simulation modelling, including the use of the Monte Carlo 
technique, informed by a large, field database validated by the relevant 
operators.  The field database incorporates key, best estimate information on 
production, and investment, operating and decommissioning expenditures.  
These refer to over 300 sanctioned fields, 131 incremental projects relating to 
these fields, 35 probable fields, and 16 possible fields.  All these are as yet 
unsanctioned but are currently being examined for development.  An additional 
database contains 234 fields defined as being in the category of technical 
reserves.  Summary data on reserves (oil/gas) and block location are available 
for these.  They are not currently being examined for development by licensees. 
 
Monte Carlo modelling was employed to estimate the possible numbers of new 
discoveries in the period to 2030.  The modelling incorporated assumptions 
based on recent trends relating to exploration effort, success rates, sizes, and 
types (oil, gas, condensate) of discovery.  A moving average of the behaviour of 
these variables over the past 5 years was calculated separately for 6 areas of the 
UKCS (Southern North Sea, (SNS), Central North Sea (CNS), Moray Firth 
(MF), Northern North Sea (NNS), West of Scotland (WOS), and Irish Sea (IS)), 
and the results employed for use in the Monte Carlo analysis.  Because of the 
very limited data for WOS and IS over the period judgemental assumptions on 
success rates and average sizes of discoveries were made for the modelling. 
 
It is postulated that the exploration effort depends substantially on a 
combination of (a) the expected success rate, (b) the likely size of discovery, 
and (c) oil/gas prices.  In the present study 3 future oil/gas price scenarios were 
employed as follows: 
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Table 1 
Future Oil and Gas Price Scenarios 
 Oil Price (real) 
$/bbl 
Gas Price (real) 
pence/therm 
High 80 70 
Medium 60 50 
Low 40 30 
 
 
The postulated numbers of annual exploration wells drilled for the whole of the 
UKCS are as follows for 2008 and 2030: 
 
Table 2 
Exploration Wells Drilled 
 2008 2030 
High 45 35 
Medium 40 32 
Low 30 22 
 
The annual numbers are modelled to decline in a linear fashion over the period. 
 
It is postulated that success rates depend substantially on a combination of (a) 
recent experience, and (b) size of the effort.  It is further suggested that higher 
effort is associated with more discoveries but with lower success rates 
compared to reduced levels of effort.  This reflects the view that low levels of 
effort will be concentrated on the lowest risk prospects, and thus that higher 
effort involves the acceptance of higher risk.  For the UKCS as a whole 3 
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success rates were postulated as follows with the medium one reflecting the 
average over the past 5 years. 
 
Table 3 
Success Rates for UKCS 
Medium effort/Medium success rate          = 25.5% 
High effort/Low success rate                      = 24% 
Low effort/High success rate                      = 27% 
 
 
It should be noted that success rates have varied considerably across sectors of 
the UKCS. Thus in the CNS and SNS the averages have exceeded 30% while in 
the other sectors success rates have been well below the average for the whole 
province. 
It is assumed that technological progress will maintain these success rates over 
the time period. 
 
The mean sizes of discoveries made in the historic period for each of the 6 
regions were calculated. They are shown in Table 4.  It was then assumed that 
the mean size of discovery would decrease in line with recent historic 
experience.  Such decline rates are quite modest.   
 
Table 4 
Mean Discovery Size MMboe 
SNS 9 
CNS 25 
NNS 25 
MF 20 
WoS 81 
IS   5 
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For purposes of the Monte Carlo modelling of new discoveries the SD was set 
at 50% of the mean value.  In line with historic experience the size distribution 
of discoveries was taken to be lognormal. 
 
Using the above information the Monte Carlo technique was employed to 
project discoveries in the 6 regions to 2030.  For the whole period the total 
numbers of discoveries for the whole of the UKCS were are follows: 
 
Table 5 
Total Number of Discoveries to 2030 
High effort/Low success rate                   245 
Medium Effort/Medium Success Rate     238 
Low effort/High success rate                   185 
 
 
For each region the average development costs (per boe) of fields in the 
probable and possible categories were calculated.  These reflect substantial cost 
inflation over the last few years.  Using these as the mean values the Monte 
Carlo technique was employed to calculate the development costs of new 
discoveries.  A normal distribution with a SD = 20% of the mean value was 
employed.  For the whole of the UKCS the average development costs on this 
basis were nearly $14/boe with quite a wide variation.  Investment costs for boe 
depend on several factors including not only the absolute costs in different 
operating conditions (such as water depth) but on the size of the fields. Thus in 
the SNS development costs were found to average nearly $14 per boe because 
of the small size of field. In the NNS they averaged $16/boe. Operating costs 
over the lifetime of the fields were also calculated, as were the 
decommissioning costs.  Total lifetime field costs (excluding E and A costs) 
were found to average nearly $25 per boe for the whole of the UKCS, and 
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averaged over $21 per boe in the SNS, nearly $25 per boe in the CNS, and $29 
per boe in the NNS. 
 
For new discoveries annual operating costs were modelled as a percentage of 
accumulated development costs.  This percentage varied according to field size.  
It was taken to increase as the size of the field was reduced reflecting the 
presence of economies of scale in the exploitation costs. Thus the field lifetime 
costs in small fields could become very high on a per boe basis. 
 
With respect to fields in the category of technical reserves it was recognised that 
many have remained undeveloped for a long time, so the mean development 
costs in each of the basins was set at $5/boe higher than the mean for the new 
discoveries in that basin. Thus for the CNS the mean development costs are 
$17/boe and in NNS $21/boe.  For purposes of Monte Carlo modelling a normal 
distribution of the recoverable reserves for each field with a SD = 50% of the 
mean was assumed.  With respect to development costs the distribution was 
assumed to be normal with a SD = 20% of the mean value. 
 
The annual numbers of new field developments were assumed to be constrained 
by the physical and financial capacity of the industry.  This subject is currently 
very pertinent in the UKCS.  The ceilings were assumed to be linked to the 
oil/gas scenarios with maxima of 20, 17, and 13 respectively under the High, 
Medium, and Low Price Cases.  These constraints do not apply to incremental 
projects which are additional to new field developments. 
  
A noteworthy feature of the 131 incremental projects in the database validated 
by operators is the expectation that the great majority will be executed over the 
next 3 or 4 years.  It is virtually certain that in the medium and longer-term 
many further incremental projects will be designed and executed.  They are just 
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not yet at the serious planning stage.  Such projects can be expected not only 
linked to currently sanctioned fields, but also to those presently classified as in 
the categories of probable, possible, technical reserves, and future discoveries. 
 
Accordingly, estimates were made of the potential extra incremental projects 
from all these sources.  Examination of the numbers of such projects and their 
key characteristics (reserves and costs) being examined by operators over the 
past 5 years indicated a decline rate in the volumes.  On the basis of this, and 
from a base of the information of the key characteristics of the projects in the 
database, it was felt that, with a decline rate reflecting historic experience, 
further portfolios of incremental projects could reasonably be expected.  As 
noted above such future projects would be spread over all categories of host 
fields.  Their sizes and costs reflect recent trends. 
 
The above modelling was conducted under the current tax system.  The outputs 
of the modelling showed expected production, field investment, operating and 
decommissioning costs1.  Tax revenues were also calculated.2  It should be 
stressed that from a national viewpoint the effects of the incentive should not be 
assessed in terms of tax revenues.  The key effects which attention should be 
concentrated are on economic production and investment.  This is consistent 
with the various PILOT objectives which are stated in terms of production and 
investment.  The effects of various sizes of value allowances for the 
Supplementary Charge (SC) were then calculated with the results highlighting 
the changes to oil and gas production, investment and operating expenditures 
and tax revenues.  The acceptable field investments are thus on a post-
                                                 
1 For full details see parts of the more comprehensive study by A.G. Kemp and L. Stephen, North Sea Study 
Occasional Paper No.109, The Prospects for Activity in the UKCS to 2035: the 2008 Perspective, October 2008, 
University of Aberdeen Department of Economics pp. 67. 
2 The tax revenues refer only to CT and SC in the UKCS. There will be substantial additional taxes paid by the 
supply chain, including corporation tax, income tax and National Insurance contribution from increased activity 
triggered by the value allowance. 
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corporation tax basis.  Clearly more would be viable on a pre-tax basis.  The 
value allowances were all modelled on a per field basis.  The values employed 
were (1) £2.5 million per year for 5 years, (2) £10 million per year for 5 years, 
(3) £20 million per year for 5 years, and (4) £50 million per year for 5 years.  In 
some cases the relevant income for SC purposes was insufficient to absorb all 
the value allowance.  The results are shown for all categories of new fields 
(probable, possible, technical reserves, and new discoveries).  Given the 
concern expressed in the consultation document with small fields the results are 
shown separately for fields with recoverable reserves of ≤ 20 mmboe under the 
$60,50 pence price case.  The results of the very high value allowance are 
shown separately for fields located West of Shetland given the particularly high 
costs of developing (including transporting) oil and gas in that area. 
 
Given the clear need to obtain maximum economic recovery from the UKCS 
the situation with respect to incremental projects in mature fields is also 
discussed.  The tax position in relation to projects subject to PRT as well as 
corporation tax and SC has recently been examined in detail by the present 
authors and the lessons for the present position of the industry are highlighted. 
 
3. Results 
 
A. Value Allowance Applied to All New Fields in UKCS 
 
i. Number of Field Developments Triggered 
 
The effects of the value allowance in triggering new field developments across 
the UKCS in the period from 2009 to 2035 inclusive are shown in summary 
form in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Number of Fields Triggered by value allowance in period to 2035 
           
  Probable Possible Technical Reserves New Exploration Total
$40,30p SCT Allowance £2.5m x 5 3 1 4 8 16 
$40,30p SCT Allowance £10m x 5 6 3 9 27 45 
$40,30p SCT Allowance £20m x 5 8 3 13 34 58 
$60,50p SCT Allowance £2.5m x 5 4 1 14 13 32 
$60,50p SCT Allowance £10m x 5 4 2 29 21 56 
$60,50p SCT Allowance £20m x 5 5 2 31 23 61 
$80,70p SCT Allowance £2.5m x 5 1 0 6 0 7 
$80,70p SCT Allowance £10m x 5 1 0 17 1 19 
$80,70p SCT Allowance £20m x 5 1 0 18 1 20 
 
 
It is seen that under the $40,30p price case the total numbers of incentivised 
fields are 16 with the £12.5 million allowance, 45 with the £50 million 
allowance, and 58 with the £100 million case.  The majority of the incentivised 
developments are in the category of new discoveries.  The policy conclusion is 
that the allowance could provide a worthwhile incentive for further exploration.  
It is also clear that the £12.5 million allowance is inadequate to provide a 
worthwhile difference to new field developments. 
 
Under the $60,50p price case the numbers of incentivised developments are 
substantially greater, being 32, 56, and 61 under the 3 sizes of allowance.  In 
this scenario it is seen that large numbers of fields in the technical reserves 
category as well as substantial numbers of new discoveries are incentivised.  
Worthwhile numbers of fields in the probable/possible field categories are also 
incentivised.  These are currently being assessed by the industry, and the fact 
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that they do not meet the investment hurdle under the current tax system is 
clearly of concern.  Again it is clear that the higher levels of allowance produce 
substantially more new developments than the £12.5 million one. 
 
Under the $80,70p price case significant numbers of fields in the category of 
technical reserves are incentivised under the £50 million and £100 million 
allowances. 
 
ii. Detailed Effects of Allowance of £12.5 million 
 
In Charts 1 – 3 the effects of the value allowance on production under the 
$40,30p case are shown.  The increases in total hydrocarbon production are seen 
to be quite modest, and it is not until well into the 2020’s that they grow to 
reach a peak of 30,000 boe/d in 2026 (Chart 3).  The aggregate increase in 
production to 2035 is 134 mmboe. 
 
Chart 1 
Change in Potential Oil Production
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Chart 2 
Change in Potential Gas Production
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Chart 3 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
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The increase comes predominantly from new discoveries.  The increase in field 
development expenditure (Chart 4) is correspondingly small, especially in the 
period before 2024.  The changes in total tax revenues are shown in Chart 5 
where both the positive and negative elements are indicated.  The positive 
elements show the increases in revenues emanating from the development of the 
fields triggered by the allowance.  The negative element shows the loss of 
revenues from the development of fields which would have occurred in the 
absence of the allowance.  It is seen (Chart 6) that on the probable/possible 
fields the increase in tax revenues broadly matches the reduction from fields 
which would in any case be developed. 
 
 
 
Chart 4 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure
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Chart 5 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 6 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Probable/Possible Fields
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The increases in production under the $60,50p price case are shown in Charts 7 
– 9.  The average increase in total hydrocarbon production is over 15,000 boe/d 
over the whole period 2009 – 2035, which is considerably more compared to the 
$40,30p scenario.  The aggregate increase in production to 2035 is 225 mmboe.  
Similarly, the increase in field investment (Chart 10) is greater than under the 
low price case.  In Chart 11 the changes in tax revenues, including both the 
gains from triggered field developments and the losses from those which would 
in any case proceed are shown. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 7 
Change in Potential Oil Production
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Chart 8 
Change in Potential Gas Production
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Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £2.5m x 5
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
mmcf/d
Probable Triggered Possible Triggered Technical Triggered New Triggered
 
 
 
 
Chart 9 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
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Chart 10 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure
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Chart 11 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The increases in production under the $80,70p case are shown in Charts 12 – 14.  
They are seen to be very small, reflecting the fact that very few developments 
are triggered.  The aggregate increase to 2035 is 48 mmboe.  It should be 
stressed that this is not because all fields are in any case economic in this 
scenario.  Large number of fields in the category of technical reserves remain 
non-commercial with the small value allowance.  Many become viable with the 
larger allowances (see below).  The overall increase in field development 
expenditure (Chart 15) is modest, but the extra in 2009 is seen to be worthwhile. 
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Chart12 
Change in Potential Oil Production
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Chart 13 
Change in Potential Gas Production
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Chart 14 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
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Chart 15 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure
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iii. Detailed Effects of Allowance of £50 million 
 
The effects of the value allowance of £50 million on production are shown in 
Charts 16 – 18 under the $40,30 pence case.  The increase may be described as 
substantial with the extra total hydrocarbon output from fields in the 
probable/possible category averaging over 40,000 boe/d for 4 years in the 
period 2012 – 2025.  The aggregate increase to 2035 is 544 mmboe.  Further, in 
the period 2021 – 2033 inclusive the average increase in production is well in 
excess of 60,000 boe/d.  The corresponding increase in development investment 
is also substantial (Chart 19).  In the 4-year period 2009 – 2012 inclusive the 
increase is around £840 million at 2008 prices.  This would come at a very 
welcome time period for the contracting sector.  The changes in tax revenues 
from all categories of fields are shown in Chart 20.  The net effect is negative.  
It is noteworthy that this outcome results from the loss of revenues from future 
discoveries.  When the fields in the probable/possible categories are considered 
(Chart 21) it is seen that there is little net loss in tax revenues over the period. 
Similarly, when fields in all categories except new discoveries are considered 
(Chart 22), the increase in tax revenues broadly equals the loss from fields 
which would otherwise proceed. 
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Chart 16 
Change in Potential Oil Production
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Chart 17 
Change in Potential Gas Production
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Chart 18 
 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
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Chart 19 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure
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Chart 20 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
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Chart 21 
 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Probable/Possible Fields
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Chart 22 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Under the $60,50 pence price scenario the changes in production from the £50 
million allowance are shown in Charts 23-25.  The effect is very substantial.  
The increase in total hydrocarbon production over the whole period 2009 – 
2035 on average exceeds 50,000 boe/d which constitutes a very worthwhile 
contribution to ultimate recovery from the UKCS.  The aggregate increase in 
the period to 2035 is 529 mmboe.  Likewise the increase in field investment 
(Chart 26) is impressive, being over £1 billion (at 2008 prices) in the period 
2009 – 2012.  Throughout the period the increase remains substantial.  The 
changes in tax revenues are shown in Chart 27.  The net effect is noticeably 
negative, but this is due to the loss of revenues from fields in the category of 
new discoveries.  If these are excluded because of the uncertainties surrounding 
their characteristics the net reduction is very much less (Chart 28). 
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Chart 23 
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Chart 24 
Change in Potential Gas Production
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Chart 25 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
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Chart 26 
Change in Potential Development  Expenditure
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 27 
 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 28 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The changes in production from the £50 million allowance under the $80,70p 
price case are shown in Charts 29 – 31.  The increases are not so large as with 
the $60,50p case because more of the fields pass the investment hurdle without 
the allowance.  Nevertheless over the whole period the increase in total 
hydrocarbon production is nearly 25,000 boe/d.  The aggregate increase to 2035 
is 258 mmboe.  The increase in field investment (Chart 32) is much less than 
under the $60,50p case but remains significant, exceeding £150 million in a 
considerable number of years.  The net change in tax revenues is substantially 
negative (Chart 33) reflecting the fact that many fields pass the investment 
hurdle under the current tax system. 
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Chart 30 
Change in Potential Gas Production
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Chart 31 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production
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Chart 32 
Change in Potential Development  Expenditure
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Chart 33 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue
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iv. Detailed Effects of Allowance at £100 million 
 
The effects of a value allowance of £100 million on production under the 
$40,30p price case are shown in Charts 34 – 36.  The effect is seen to be fairly 
dramatic with the increase in total hydrocarbon production over the whole 
period averaging well in excess of 80,000 boe/d.  The aggregate increase in the 
period to 2035 is 825 mmboe.  In a significant number of years the increase 
exceeds 100,000 boe/d.  The increase in field investment is correspondingly 
impressive (Chart 37).  In the period 2009 – 2012 the total increase exceeds £1 
billion at 2008 prices.  In the great majority of years the increase exceeds £200 
million.  The net change in tax revenues from all categories of fields is negative 
(Chart 38).  It is noticeable, however, that, if the fields in the category of new 
discoveries are excluded because of the uncertainties regarding their 
characteristics, the net change in tax revenues is quite small (Chart 39). 
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Chart 35 
Change in Potential Gas Production 
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Chart 36 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production 
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Chart 37 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure 
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Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 38 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue 
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Chart 39 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue 
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Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The effects of the £100 million allowance on production under the $60,50p case 
are shown in Charts 40 – 42.  The increases are seen to be very considerable 
with the average for total hydrocarbon production being around 65,000 boe/d 
over the period to 2035.  In 7 of the years the increase exceeds 80,000 boe/d.  
The aggregate increase in the period to 2035 is 652 mmboe.  The increase in 
field investment is correspondingly substantial (Chart 43).  In the period 2009 – 
2013 inclusive the increase is £1.3 billion (at 2008 prices).  Over the whole 
period the annual average increase is over £250 million.  The net change in tax 
revenues is substantially negative (Chart 44), but if the fields in the new 
discoveries category are excluded because of the uncertainties surrounding their 
characteristics the net loss is much less (Chart 45). 
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Chart 40 
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Chart 41 
Change in Potential Gas Production 
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Chart 42 
 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production 
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Chart 43 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure 
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Chart 44 
 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue 
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £20m x 5
-700 
-600 
-500 
-400 
-300 
-200 
-100 
0
100
200
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
£m (2008)
Probable Fields Probable Triggered Possible Fields
Possible Triggered Technical Reserves Technical Triggered
New  Exploration New  Triggered Total
 
 
 
Chart 45 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue 
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £20m x 5
-500 
-400 
-300 
-200 
-100 
0
100
200
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
£m (2008)
Probable Fields Probable Triggered Possible Fields
Possible Triggered Technical Reserves Technical Triggered
 
 40
The increases in production from the £100 million allowance under the $80,70p 
price case are shown in Charts 46 – 48.  The increase is relatively modest in the 
years to 2015 but becomes much larger in the 2020’s, exceeding 50,000 boe/d 
for a considerable number of years when the development of a substantial 
number of fields in the category of technical reserves is triggered.  The 
aggregate increase in the period to 2035 is 352 mmboe.  The increase in field 
investment is substantial (Chart 49).  In several years in the 2020’s the annual 
increase exceeds £300 million.  The net change in tax revenues is substantially 
negative (Chart 50), though it is much less when the future discoveries are 
excluded (Chart 51). 
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Chart 47 
Change in Potential Gas Production 
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Chart 48 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production 
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Chart 49 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure 
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Chart 50 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue 
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Chart 51 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue 
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v. Effects of Value Allowance of £250 million 
 
The effects of a very large value allowance (£250 million) were also modelled 
but are not presented here in detail.  It is noteworthy that under the $40,30 
pence case the aggregate increase in production in the period to 2035 is 899 
mmboe.  Under the $60,50 pence case the corresponding increase is 901 mmboe, 
and under the $80,70 pence case the aggregate increase is 455 mmboe. 
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B. Value Allowance Applied to Small Fields (≤ 20 mmboe) 
 
i. Numbers of Field Developments Triggered 
 
The results in the case where the various value allowance are given only to 
small fields (defined as those with recoverable reserves of ≤ 20 mmboe) are 
now discussed.  The numbers of new field developments which are triggered by 
the allowance in the period to 2035 are shown in Table 7 classified according to 
category. 
 
Table 7 
Number of small fields (≤ 20 mmboe) Triggered by Value Allowance to 2035 
 
 Probable Possible Technical 
Reserves 
New 
Exploration 
Total 
$40,30p SCT Allowance 
£2.5m x 5 
3 1 4 7 15 
$40,30p SCT Allowance  
£10m x 5 
5 2 8 20 35 
$40,30p SCT Allowance  
£20m x 5 
6 2 8 22 38 
$60,50p SCT Allowance 
£2.5m x 5 
4 1 14 12 31 
$60,50p SCT Allowance  
£10m x 5 
4 2 26 19 51 
$60,50p SCT Allowance  
£20m x 5 
4 2 27 21 54 
$80,70p SCT Allowance 
£2.5m x 5 
1 0 6 0 7 
$80,70p SCT Allowance  
£10m x 5 
1 0 15 0 16 
$80,70p SCT Allowance  
£20m x 5 
1 0 15 0 16 
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Under the $40,30p case it is seen that the £12.5 million allowance triggers 15 
developments over the period.  The £50 allowance triggers 35 new 
developments, and the £100 million one triggers 38.  In both cases the majority 
of the developments are in the category of new discoveries.  Under the $60,50 
pence case the £12.5 million allowance triggers 31 new developments, while the 
£50 million allowance triggers 51, and the £100 million one triggers 54 
developments.  It is seen that very substantial numbers of developments in the 
categories of technical reserves and new discoveries are triggered with the 
higher levels of allowance.  Under the $80,70p case it is seen that the £12.5 
million allowance triggers very few developments, while the larger ones each 
trigger 16 new fields, the great majority being in the technical reserves category. 
 
ii. Detailed Effects of £12.5 million Value Allowance 
 
The effects of the small value allowance of £12.5 million in procuring extra 
production are shown in Charts 52 -54.  The general effect is quite modest, with 
the extra total hydrocarbon production averaging around 12,000 boe/d over the 
whole period.  The aggregate increase in the period to 2035 is 108 mmboe.  In 
the later part of the period for some years it is in the range 15,000 – 20,000 
boe/d.  The increase in new field investment (Chart 55) is correspondingly small.  
The changes in tax revenues across all categories of fields are shown in Chart 
56.  Reflecting the changes in activity they are very small throughout the period.  
The net effect on fields in the probable/possible categories is positive (Chart 57). 
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Chart 52 
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Chart 53 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
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Chart 54 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
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Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £2.5m x 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
m boe/d
Probable Triggered Possible Triggered Technical Triggered New Triggered
 
 
 
 
Chart 55 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
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Chart 56 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £2.5m x 5
-40 
-30 
-20 
-10 
0
10
20
30
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
£m (2008)
Probable Fields Probable Triggered Possible Fields
Possible Triggered Technical Reserves Technical Triggered
New Exploration New Triggered Total
 
 
 
Chart 57 
 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Probable/Possible Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The effects of the £12.5 million allowance on production under the $60,50 
pence case are shown in Charts 58 – 60.  The increase in total hydrocarbon 
production averages more than 20,000 boe/d over the whole period.  The 
aggregate increase in the period to 2035 is 195 mmboe.  In several years it 
exceeds 25,000 boe/d.  The increase in field investment (Chart 61) may be 
defined as modest though certainly worthwhile.  The change in total tax 
revenues is shown in Chart 62 where it is seen that the net effect is negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 58 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £2.5m x 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
tb/d
Probable Triggered Possible Triggered Technical Triggered New Triggered
 
 
 
 50
 
Chart 59 
 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
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Chart 60 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
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Chart 61 
 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
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Chart 62 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
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SCT Value Allowance £2.5m x 5
-150 
-100 
-50 
0
50
100
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
£m (2008)
Probable Fields Probable Triggered Possible Fields
Possible Triggered Technical Reserves Technical Triggered
New Exploration New Triggered Total
 
 
 52
The increase in production under the $80,70 pence case with the £12.5 million 
allowance is shown in Charts 63 – 65.  The effects are seen to be extremely 
small.  The aggregate increase in the period to 2035 is only 48 mmboe.  This is 
reflected in the related increase in field investment (Chart 66).  There is a clear 
loss of net tax revenues (Chart 67). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 63 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
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Chart 64 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
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Chart 65 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
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Chart 66 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
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Chart 67 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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iii. Detailed Effects of Value Allowance of £50 million 
 
The effects of a value allowance of £50 million on production under the $40,30 
pence price case are shown in Charts 68 – 70.  Total hydrocarbon production is 
seen to increase by over 30,000 boe/d across the whole period.  In 7 of the years 
the increase exceeds 40,000 boe/d with much of the increase in the longer term 
coming from fields in the category of new discoveries.  The aggregate increase 
in the period to 2035 is 313 mmboe.  The increase in field investment (Chart 71) 
averages just under £100 million per year over the whole period with £365 
million (at 2008 prices) coming in the period 2009 – 2012 inclusive.  The 
changes in total tax revenues (Chart 72) are seen to be relatively small. 
 
 
 
Chart 68 
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Chart 69 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 70 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 71 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 72 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The effects of the £50 million allowance under the $60,50 pence case on 
production are shown in Charts 73 -75.  The increase in total hydrocarbon 
production is around 35,000 boe/d over the whole period and in 4 years the 
increase exceeds 50,000 boe/d. The aggregate increase in the period to 2035 is 
359 mmboe.  In this scenario significant extra production comes from fields in 
the category of technical reserves as well as from new discoveries.  The related 
increase in field investment (Chart 76) exceeds £100 million per year on 
average with the annual value exceeding £250 million in some years.  The 
change in tax revenues (Chart 77) is seen to be significantly negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 73 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
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Chart 74 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 75 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 76 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 77 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The changes in production form the £50 million allowance under the $80,70 
pence case are shown in Charts 78 – 80.  The increase averages nearly 15,000 
boe/d over the whole period with virtually all the extra production coming from 
fields in the category of technical reserves.  The aggregate increase over the 
period to 2035 is 157 mmboe.  The increase in field investment (Chart 81) is 
relatively high compared to the modest increase in production, reflecting the 
high costs of fields in this category.  The changes in tax revenues (Chart 82) are 
seen to be significantly negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 78 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
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Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 79 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 80 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
SCT Value Allowance £10m x 5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
m boe/d
Probable Triggered Technical Triggered
 
 
 63
Chart 81 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 82 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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iv. Detailed Effects of Value Allowance of £100 million 
 
The changes in production emanating from a value allowance of £100 million 
are shown in Charts 83 -85 under the $40,30 pence case.  The increase in total 
hydrocarbon production exceeds 30,000 boe/d over the whole period.  The 
aggregate increase over the period to 2035 is 355 mmboe.  In the near term 
there are worthwhile increases from fields in the probable/possible field 
categories and in the longer term the increase is mostly from fields in the 
category of new discoveries.  The yearly increase in field investment averages 
around £100 million.  In the period 2009 – 2012 the total increase is around 
£490 million (Chart 86).  The change in total tax revenues (Chart 87) is seen to 
be quite small. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 83 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
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Chart 84 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 85 
Change in Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 86 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 87 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$40/bbl and 30p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The changes to production under the $60,50 pence case with the £100 million 
allowance are shown in Charts 88 – 90.  The average increase in total 
hydrocarbon production is nearly 40,000 boe/d over the period.  The aggregate 
increase over the period to 2035 is 387 mmboe.  The corresponding increase in 
field investment (Chart 91) is very substantial averaging around £150 million 
per year over the period.  In 9 years the increase exceeds £200 million.  The net 
change in tax revenues (Chart 92) is significantly negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 88 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 89 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 90 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 91 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 92 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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The changes to production under the $80,70 pence case with the £100 million 
allowance are shown in Chart 93 – 95.  The increase in total hydrocarbon 
production averages around 15,000 boe/d over the period with all the output 
coming from fields in the category of technical reserves.  The aggregate 
increase in the period to 2035 is 157 mmboe.  The increase in field investment 
(Chart 96) is relatively large in relation to the production because of the high 
costs of the fields in this category.  The change in tax revenues (Chart 97) is 
significantly negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 93 
Change in Potential Oil Production from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 94 
Change in Potential Gas Production from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 95 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 96 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 97 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from Small Fields
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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-700 
-600 
-500 
-400 
-300 
-200 
-100 
0
100
2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035
£m (2008)
Probable Fields Probable Triggered Possible Fields
Technical Reserves Technical Triggered New Exploration
Total
 
 73
C. Value Allowance Applied to West of Shetlands Fields 
 
i. Number of Field Developments Triggered 
 
The results for this part of the analysis require extra explanation.  The costs of 
the new field developments are very high with the average development costs 
being around $20/ boe.  A considerable number of the undeveloped fields are in 
the category of technical reserves where the development costs are recognised 
to be high.  The position under the present tax system is summarised in Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
 
Number of Field Developments Passing and Failing Investment Hurdle under 
Present Tax System 
 
 $40,30 pence $60,50 pence $80,70  pence 
Fail Pass Fail Pass Fail Pass 
25 1 15 21 3 35 
 
 
 
The findings in Table 8 help to explain the results of the introduction of various 
sizes of value allowances in triggering new developments which are shown in 
Table 9.  It is seen that the introduction of the value allowance (even the very 
large one of £250 million) has little effect on the numbers of developments 
being triggered.  Under the $40,30 pence nearly all the projects fail with the 
allowance.  Under the $60,50 pence case some projects pass without the 
allowance but a substantial number fail even with a large allowance.  On the 
other hand under the $80,70 pence case the great majority of projects pass the 
hurdle under the present tax system and a significant value allowance triggers 
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the development of the remaining few fields.  Thus for different reasons the 
effects of the value allowance is fairly modest in all the scenarios examined. 
 
It follows from the above that the effects of the value allowance on activity 
levels are quite modest.  It should be stressed that this is not to be interpreted as 
a generalised conclusion.  There are very many permutations of oil/gas prices, 
investment hurdles and their interaction with the tax system and only 
representative selection can be analysed here in details.  From Table 9 it is seen 
that under the $40,30 pence scenario no new developments are triggered with 
the 2 smaller value allowances and only 1 is triggered with the 2 higher levels 
of allowance. 
 
Table 9 
 
Numbers of Fields in West of Shetlands Triggered by Value Allowance to 2035 
 
 Probable Possible Technical 
Reserves 
New 
Exploration 
Total 
$40,30p  SCT Allowance   
£2.5m x 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
$40,30p  SCT Allowance   
£10m x 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
$40,30p  SCT Allowance   
£20m x 5 
0 0 0 1 1 
$40,30p  SCT Allowance   
£50m x 5 
0 0 0 1 1 
$60,50p  SCT Allowance   
£2.5m x 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
$60,50p  SCT Allowance   
£10m x 5 
0 0 1 0 1 
$60,50p  SCT Allowance   
£20m x 5 
0 0 1 0 1 
$60,50p  SCT Allowance   
£50m x 5 
0 0 3 0 3 
$80,70p  SCT Allowance   
£2.5m x 5 
0 0 0 0 0 
$80,70p  SCT Allowance   
£10m x 5 
0 0 3 0 3 
$80,70p  SCT Allowance   
£20m x 5 
0 0 3 0 3 
$80,70p  SCT Allowance   
£50m x 5 
0 0 3 0 3 
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Under the $60,50 pence scenario only 1 new development is triggered with the 
£50 million and £100 million allowances.  With the £250 million allowance 3 
new developments in the category of technical reserves are triggered.  The 
resulting increases in production are shown in Charts 98 – 100.  For the whole 
period where the increase is effective the average increment is around 15,000 
boe/d and in 4 of the years it exceeds 20,000 boe/d.  The aggregate increase in 
the period to 2035 is 91 mmboe.  The increase in field development 
expenditures is shown in Chart 101 and the change in total tax revenues in Chart 
102. 
 
 
 
 
Chart 98 
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Chart 99 
Change in Potential Gas Production from WoS
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 100 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from WoS
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 101 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from WoS
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 102 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from WoS
$60/bbl and 50p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Under the $80,70 pence case, while the number of field developments triggered 
by the £250 million allowance is the same as under the $60,50 pence case their 
composition is not the same.  The increases in production under the high price 
scenario are shown in Charts 103 – 105.  A key difference compared to the 
$60,50 pence case is that an early gas field development is triggered (Chart 104).  
In the current difficult investment environment in the West of Shetlands region 
this could contribute to the triggering of the cluster development which is 
necessary for the full exploitation of gas.  The extra development could thus be 
worth considerably more to the nation than its individual size would indicate.  
The increase in field investment is shown in Chart 106 and the total change in 
tax revenues in Chart 107.  The net change in tax revenues is seen to be 
negative. 
 
 
 
Chart 103 
Change in Potential Oil Production from WoS
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 104 
Change in Potential Gas Production from WoS
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 105 
Change in Total Hydrocarbon Production from WoS
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 106 
Change in Potential Development Expenditure from WoS
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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Chart 107 
Change in Potential Tax Revenue from WoS
$80/bbl and 70p/therm
Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3
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4. Interpretation of Results 
 
The results of the detailed modelling in Section 3 clearly indicate that the 
introduction of the value allowance for the SC can enhance activity levels as 
measured by economic production and field investment.  It is also clear that the 
magnitude of the increased activity depends on the size of the value allowance 
and the oil/ gas price scenario chosen to evaluate the effect.  Of the 3 price 
scenarios examined the effect is found to be greatest under the $60,50 pence 
case.  While worthwhile production is incentivised under the $40,30 pence case 
less fields are viable under this price scenario.  Relief from the SC is 
insufficient to make many more projects viable.  With the $80,70 pence price 
scenario more projects are in any case viable without the benefit of the value 
allowance and thus less are incentivised on account of it.  It is clear from the 
results that the higher the allowance the greater the number of field 
developments incentivised.  Thus the £12.5 million allowance has a much 
smaller effect than the £50 million one which in turn has a smaller effect than 
the £100 million one.  It should be emphasised that the incentivised fields 
generally still pay tax at the 30% rate on the working assumption employed that 
the allowance is restricted to the field in question.  A relevant consideration in 
determining how big the allowance should be is the need to incentivise fields in 
the category of technical reserves.  Many of these are relatively high cost (per 
boe) because they are located far from existing infrastructure or are relatively 
small or have technical problems (such as HP/ HT characteristics).  It was thus 
found that under the $80,70 pence price case substantial numbers in this 
category were non-viable under the present tax system and needed a large value 
allowance to render them acceptable (Table 6). 
 
The consultation document makes specific reference to small fields.  These now 
(numerically) dominate the remaining potential in the UKCS.  Adopting a 
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definition of ≤ 20 mmboe and undertaking the modelling on the same basis as 
for the totality of new fields revealed a consistent pattern of results.  Thus the 
numbers of fields incentivised increased with the size of the allowance and 
more developments were triggered under the $60,50 pence price scenarios than 
under the other two.  Under the $80,70 pence case many fields in the category 
of technical reserves required a substantial allowance to render them viable. 
 
In the case of the fields located West of Shetlands the modelling of the 
scenarios indicated that substantial allowances were required to make a 
worthwhile impact on the number of viable new developments given the 
relatively high costs per boe of the undeveloped fields.  The modelling 
underestimated the potential potency of triggering new developments because 
under the $60,50 pence case even the very large (£250 million) allowance left 
many fields non-viable while under the $80,70 pence case most fields were 
found to pass the investment hurdle without the allowance.  Thus at price 
scenarios between $60,50 pence and $80,70 pence the value allowance would 
have been much more potent. 
 
It should be stressed that the detailed modelling has been undertaken using 
discount rates of 10% in real terms and minimum acceptable NPV/ I ratios of 
0.3.  Given the current problems in the financial markets, the resulting capital 
scarcity could well mean that these assumptions do not fully reflect the tough 
conditions facing some investors.  The effects of raising the discount rates and 
the minimum capital productivity index (NPV/ I) have been modelled under the 
current tax system.  The results for discount rates of 12.5% and 15% and 
minimum NPV/ I ratios of 0.5 in terms of numbers of viable new fields (and 
incremental projects) are shown in Table 10 (excluding any value allowance).  
The numbers of viable fields/ projects are seen to be particularly sensitive to an 
increase in the minimum NPV/ I ratio from 0.3 to 0.5.  The effects on total 
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production in the period 2008 – 2035 from raising the discount rate from 10% to 
12.5% and the minimum NPV/ I ration from 0.3 to 0.5 are shown in Tables 11 – 
14.  It is seen that the decrease in cumulative production from an increase in the 
capital productivity index is very substantial. 
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Table 10 
 
  
Number of Field Developments and Projects Passing  
under Different Investment Hurdle Rates 
        
Price 
and 
Category 
Discount rate 
Min.NPV/I 
 10%  
0.3  
10%  
 0.5  
12.5% 
 0.3  
12.5%  
0.5  
15%  
 0.3  
15% 
 0.5  
$40,30 pence         
Incremental 
Projects  78 69 79 66 78 64 
Probable fields  5 2 4 2 4 2 
Possible fields  5 5 5 5 5 5 
New exploration 
finds  48 23 39 18 34 14 
Technical reserves 
fields  5 0 4 0 3 0 
Total  141 99 131 91 124 85 
        
        
$60,50 pence        
Incremental 
Projects  103 92 99 88 98 85 
Probable fields  28 18 25 16 21 11 
Possible fields  10 8 10 8 9 5 
New exploration 
finds  207 173 205 154 200 136 
Technical reserves 
fields  103 50 93 44 81 41 
Total  451 341 432 310 409 278 
        
        
$80, 70 pence        
Incremental 
Projects  110 105 107 103 106 101 
Probable fields  32 32 32 32 32 29 
Possible fields  15 10 13 11 13 10 
New exploration 
finds  244 241 244 235 243 227 
Technical reserves 
fields  212 163 203 154 191 142 
Total  613 551 599 535 585 509 
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Table 11 
 Cumulative Potential Production from 2008 to 2035 (Mmboe)    
 Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.3     
 Standard case       
 Sanctioned 
Current 
Incremental 
Future 
Incremental
Probable 
Fields 
Possible 
Fields 
Technical 
Reserves 
New 
Exploration TOTAL 
$40/bbl 
and 
30p/therm 7106 664 1107 187 174 44 931 10212 
$60/bbl 
and 
50p/therm 7244 1044 1898 838 240 1581 3102 15947 
$80/bbl 
and 
70p/therm 7352 1344 2680 901 249 3804 3553 19884 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
 Cumulative Potential Production from 2008 to 2035 (Mmboe)    
 Hurdle : Real NPV @ 10% / Real Devex @ 10% = 0.5     
 Standard case       
 Sanctioned Incremental 
Future 
Incremental
Probable 
Fields 
Possible 
Fields 
Technical 
Reserves 
New 
Exploration TOTAL 
$40/bbl 
and 
30p/therm 7106 578 968 153 174 0 401 9381 
$60/bbl 
and 
50p/therm 7244 792 1543 560 212 1090 2708 14148 
$80/bbl 
and 
70p/therm 7352 1047 2227 868 240 2969 3518 18222 
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Table 13 
 Cumulative Potential Production from 2008 to 2035 (MMboe)    
 Hurdle : Real NPV @ 12.5% / Real Devex @ 12.5% = 0.3    
 Standard case       
 Sanctioned Incremental 
Future 
Incremental
Probable 
Fields 
Possible 
Fields 
Technical 
Reserves 
New 
Exploration TOTAL 
$40/bbl 
and 
30p/therm 7106 664 1109 176 174 43 741 10013 
$60/bbl 
and 
50p/therm 7244 928 1782 793 240 1467 3086 15540 
$80/bbl 
and 
70p/therm 7352 1327 2640 901 244 3613 3553 19631 
         
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 
 Cumulative Potential Production from 2008 to 2035 (Mmboe)    
 Hurdle : Real NPV @ 12.5% / Real Devex @ 12.5% = 0.5    
 Standard case       
 Sanctioned Incremental 
Future 
Incremental
Probable 
Fields 
Possible 
Fields 
Technical 
Reserves 
New 
Exploration TOTAL 
$40/bbl 
and 
30p/therm 7106 560 937 153 174 0 258 9188 
$60/bbl 
and 
50p/therm 7244 764 1491 457 212 437 2349 12953 
$80/bbl 
and 
70p/therm 7352 1042 2216 868 241 2774 3406 17899 
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It follows from the above that under these more stringent assumptions about 
capital market conditions there are further prospects for the value allowance 
making a positive contribution to incentivising new field developments.  There 
will clearly be more fields which are submarginal under the present tax system 
and which could be rendered acceptable by the relief.  The overall conclusion is 
thus that the number of field developments which could be incentivised by a 
worthwhile size of value allowance is likely to be understated by the use of 10% 
discount rates and NPV/ I > 0.3 in the modelling. 
 
5. Incremental Projects 
 
The present consultation document deals principally with new fields.  In the 
current stage of the exploitation of the UKCS and the present investment 
environment it is also important to incentivise the development of incremental 
projects in existing fields.  It is clear from Tables 10 – 14 that incremental 
projects can play a major role in the full economic exploitation of the UKCS.  In 
PRT-paying fields the overall tax rate is 75% (PRT at 50%, CT at 30% and SC 
at 20% with PRT being a deduction for CT and SC).  The present authors have 
very recently undertaken a detailed study of the effects of PRT on investment in 
new projects. 3   Cases were found where, using the same price scenarios, 
discount rates and minimum NPV/ I ratios as in the main part of this study, 
incremental projects were being deterred.  It was suggested that a formula 
should be designed and published which would clearly indicate the conditions 
under which PRT would be removed from the incremental project.  The 
Government had suggested that PRT could be removed on a discretionary basis 
from incremental projects which the investor had demonstrated were being 
inhibited by PRT and which would proceed in its absence.  The potential relief 
                                                 
3 See A G Kemp and L Stephen, North Sea Study Occasional Paper No. 110,  The Economics of PRT 
Redetermination for Incremental Projects in the UKCS, University of Aberdeen Department of Economics, 
November 2008, pp. 56. 
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is also restricted to projects which could be clearly distinguished as separate 
from the main field.  The modelling by the present authors found that this 
definition was unduly restrictive and could result in investment being deterred 
in incremental projects which were not detached from the main field.  The 
potential relief should apply to all incremental projects. 
 
An earlier Government consultation document discussed the possibility of 
schemes which would abolish PRT altogether, with a buy-out scheme being a 
preferred specific option for implementing the concept.  This scheme has much 
merit, and it is unfortunate that agreement on the idea was not reached between 
the Government and the industry.  Implementation of the scheme would have 
significantly enhanced the attractions of investment in incremental projects at a 
time when low oil prices are inhibiting them.  The materiality of a project and 
its capital productivity are greatly reduced when PRT is levied.  The scheme 
would also deal effectively with the vexed problem of PRT relief for 
decommissioning costs.  It is thus suggested that the scheme deserves 
reconsideration. 
 
A high proportion of incremental projects relate to non-PRT-paying fields.  
While the tax burden on these is clearly less than on PRT-paying projects it can 
still substantially affect the materiality of returns.  Some of the projects are 
known to be relatively high cost.  While the effects of the current tax system on 
these projects does not form part of the present consultation it is felt that 
consideration should be given to this issue in the current investment climate of 
relatively low oil/ gas prices, higher unit costs, and difficulties of raising debt 
and equity capital. 
 
 
 
 89
6. Exploration Incentives 
 
The current capital market difficulties combined with the low oil/ gas prices are 
impacting greatly on the (mostly smaller) companies which rely on external 
funds for financing their investment activities.  Much of the exploration in the 
UKCS is undertaken by medium and small companies and their exploration 
budgets are currently very likely to be reduced.  It is expected that the volume 
of exploration activity in 2009 will be very much below that experienced in 
recent years.  In that context the impact of the tax system on investment in 
exploration deserves further examination.  Currently companies which are 
already in a tax-paying position receive full relief for their exploration costs 
whether these result in a discovery or not.  Investors not in a tax-paying position 
can carry forward their allowances for exploration, appraisal and development 
at 6% compound interest for up to 6 years.  This was designed to reflect a 
riskless rate of interest (3.5% real plus 2.5% inflation).  It does not reflect the 
cost of capital for the risky exploration activity.  Further, relief is only given 
when the investor obtains income against which the allowance can be set.  For 
existing investors the Government shares in all the exploration risks but not 
with new investors who have no production income.  Arguably this 
discrimination against new entrants is reducing the exploration effect by a class 
of investor which is showing much interest in the activity.  This problem is 
exacerbated in current circumstances by the reduced cash flows from the price 
collapse and the capital market difficulties. 
 
Given the above there is a case for enhancing the current tax relief for investors 
not in a tax-paying position.  In Norway this issue is dealt with by the provision 
of cash rebates to the extent of the marginal tax rate of the investor for approved 
exploration activities.  Conceptually, the introduction of this in the UKCS 
would be to provide equality of treatment between existing taxpayers and non-
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taxpayers.  It would also incentivise exploration by companies which are keen 
to undertake the activity but which are inhibited by the current combination of 
low cash flows and difficulties of raising external capital.  A less potent device 
could be to raise the interest rate on allowances carried forward from 6%to a 
rate which reflected the current cost of capital for the activity.  This device 
might not be very effective in current circumstances.  Capital providers could 
well be inhibited by the exploration risk involved.  If, however, the preferred 
scheme, akin to that now in use in Norway, were employed, explorers would be 
more likely to obtain finance from capital providers who would be reassured by 
the guarantied availability of refunds relating to approved expenditures. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
It is clear that the top priority with respect to the UKCS is to procure maximum 
economic recovery.  This requires investment in (1) new field developments, (2) 
incremental projects, and (3) exploration to translate the remaining potential 
into discoveries.  The tax system should not inhibit these activities.  For new 
field developments the modelling undertaken in this study provided conclusive 
evidence that a value allowance against the SC could trigger further new 
developments.  The extent of the extra production and investment depends on 
the size of the allowance and the oil/ gas price scenario employed.  Of the 3 
scenarios modelled in detail ((1) $40,30 pence, (2) $60,50 pence, and (3) $80,70 
pence) it was found that the strongest effect on activity was found with the 
$60,50 pence case.  This might well be a central scenario currently employed by 
investors.  A key finding was that a substantial allowance was needed to trigger 
a substantial number of developments.  Thus many more were triggered with an 
allowance of £100 million per field compared to £12.5 million.  While there is 
clearly room for debate on the appropriate size of allowance the modelling 
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found that a value allowance in the £50 million - £100 million range could have 
very substantial effects under the $60,50 pence price scenario. 
 
It should be stressed that all the incentivised developments are economic ones 
and continue to pay North Sea corporation tax.  It is arguable that all 
developments which remained viable in a pre-tax basis but not on a post-tax 
basis should be incentivised by the tax system, given the clear need to 
encourage investment and moderate the productive decline rate.  The proposals 
for a value allowance are in this sense modest in their extent as they apply only 
to the SC.  The detailed modelling showed the positive effects of the 
introduction of the value allowance on North Sea tax revenues.  It also showed 
the negative effect on these revenues from projects which would in any case 
have proceeded.  The positive effect from increased activity on taxes paid in the 
whole supply chain (such as non-North Sea corporation tax, personal income 
tax and NI contributions) was not modelled.  It is argued that policy-making 
should be prioritised by the need to maximise economic production from the 
UKCS and not by the consequential effects on tax revenues which are best 
regarded as a residual item from activities in the UKCS. 
 
The modelling undertaken initially applied to all new fields.  When it was 
restricted to small fields (recoverable reserves ≤ 20 mmboe) it was found that 
large numbers were incentivised for development by the allowance, especially 
with the larger values.  Thus, given the lack of materiality in these small fields 
generally it is felt that the allowance should apply to all of them. 
 
The modelling of fields located West of Shetland clearly brought out the 
marginal nature of a high proportion of the uncommitted fields in the category 
of technical reserves.  Four value allowances were modelled, including a large 
one of £250 million.  The modelling brought out clearly that a substantial 
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number of fields (25) failed the investment hurdle under the present tax system 
at prices in the $40,30 pence case, and 15 failed under the $60,50 pence case.  
In the latter case the large value allowance (£250 million) incentivised the 
development of 3 of these.  The remaining 12 continued to fail the hurdle.  It is 
clear that a large allowance is required to have a worthwhile effect on 
investment in this region. 
 
Limitation on appropriate data did not permit systematic economic modelling of 
HP/ HT and heavy oil fields.  However, it is clear from the work undertaken for 
all of the UKCS that fields with particularly high costs and/ or significantly 
lower prices require larger value allowances to have a worthwhile effect on 
investment. 
 
While the consultation document did not specifically deal with incremental 
projects it is felt that these should be considered in the light of the major fall in 
oil prices.  The PRT relief scheme for identifiable incremental projects already 
in place should be extended to all types of incremental projects in these fields.  
More fundamentally, the earlier proposal to consider PRT buy-out schemes 
should be discussed again.  The merits of the early abolition of PRT through a 
buy-out scheme are greater than ever given the existing investment climate.  A 
reduction in the overall rate of tax from 75% to 50% would greatly enhance 
investment incentives in these fields.  Time is of the essence here if full 
advantage is to be made of the opportunities prior to decommissioning. 
 
Exploration in the UKCS will suffer as a result of the combination of oil price 
fall and capital rationing following from the problems in the financial markets.  
There is a clear need to incentivise exploration activity.  New players without 
tax cover are disadvantaged under the present tax system and, as they are 
generally small/medium in size, access to external capital is particularly 
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difficult.  The Norwegian scheme whereby investors not in a taxpaying position 
receive refunds for approved exploration at their marginal tax rate would 
equalise their position with full tax-paying investors.  It would also make it 
easier for them to raise external funds given the guarantee of the Government 
refund. 
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